Project Awarded: $30,000
We will investigate the nature of visual representations in variants of the Sperling task by comparing two competing models of visual perception that make different predictions about the precision with which visual stimuli are represented (Ma, 2018; Zhang & Luck 2008). Our predictions about model fit are informed by arguments regarding dissociative theories of consciousness, which posit a distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. The results of the classic Sperling experiment have been cited as evidence in favor of dissociative theories -specifically, as providing evidence that phenomenal consciousness overflows access (Block 1995, 2007, 2011). However, opponents of dissociative theories, who typically equate consciousness with access, claim that subjects simply experience a “degraded”, fragmented, or less determinate type of information during the Sperling task (Cohen and Dennett, 2011; Stazicker, 2011). Our experimental variants and model comparisons will allow us to estimate the precision of subjects’ perceptual representations and to assess whether participants were initially aware of all the items in the display, or whether they were never fully aware but perceived only a gist-like or degraded representation. Our results will adjudicate or at least narrow the space of possible empirical disagreement between proponents and opponents of dissociative theories of consciousness.
Trey Boone, PhD. Visiting Fellow, Duke University
Gerardo Viera, PhD. Lecturer, University of Sheffield
Jennifer Lee, PhD Candidate. Department of Psychology, New York University
Lara Krisst, PhD Candidate. Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis